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Abstract
The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure 
law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the 
defendant in the criminal trial.
The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural 
guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law 
of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 
paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according 
to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected 
of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to 
make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw 
conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.
Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to 
testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant 
not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be 
compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be 
sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. 
Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a 
fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with 
the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must 
be necessary in a democratic Romanian society. 
The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege 
against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the 
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right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European 
Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the 
European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any 
other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having 
committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness 
to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him 
or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is 
essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.
Keywords: fair trial, right to remain silent, procedural guarantee, 
penal code.
Introductory issues regarding the right to silence and 
to non-self-incrimination
The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural 
guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law 
of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 
paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according 
to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected 
of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to 
make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw 
conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.
The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege 
against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the 
right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European 
Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the 
European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any 
other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having 
committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness 
to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him 
or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. Such 
persons may refuse to make statements, answer questions, or hand 
over written documents, objects that might incriminate them (nemo 
debet prodere se ipsum – no one is obliged to accuse himself).
Thus, unlike the former regulation from which only the essence 
of those rights resulted1, upon entry into force of the New Criminal 
Procedure Code, the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination that had already been guaranteed in the case law of the 
Administratīvā un Kriminālā Justīcija Nr. 2/2018
27
European Court of Justice acquired an appropriate regulation meant 
to agree with the nature and purpose of the conventional guarantee.
According to Art. 70 par. (2) of the former Criminal Procedure Code, 
the suspect or the defendant is informed about the deed that makes 
up the subject matter of the case, the legal classification thereof, the 
right to have a defender, as well as the right not to make any statement, 
while also being informed about the fact that everything he declares 
may be used against him, as well. If the suspect or the defendant 
makes a statement, he is asked to declare everything he knows about 
the deed and about the accusation being brought against him. 
The new Criminal Procedure Code provides, in Art. 83 letter a), as 
the primary right of the suspect or defendant, “the right not to make 
any statement during the criminal proceedings, their attention being 
drawn to the fact that their refusal to make any statements shall not 
cause them to suffer any unfavourable consequences, and that any 
statement they do make may be used as evidence against them”.
Also in order to guarantee the right to silence, Art. 109 par. (3) 
of the new Criminal Procedure Code provides that if, during the 
hearing, the suspect or defendant exercises his right to silence (to 
remain silent) in respect of any of the facts or circumstances about 
which he is being asked, the hearing will no longer be continued, and 
a report of the hearing will be drawn up.
The right not to make any statements is also stipulated in the field 
of preventive measures. According to Art. 143 par. (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, “the prosecutor or the criminal investigation 
body shall inform the suspect or defendant of his right to appoint 
a defender. He shall also be made aware of his right to make no 
statement, his attention being drawn to the fact that anything he 
declares may be used against him, as well”.
In the same sense, Art. 225 par. (8) of the New Criminal 
Procedure Code provides that, prior to proceeding to the hearing of 
the defendant, the Judge for Rights and Liberties shall inform him of 
the offence of which he is accused and of his right not to make any 
statements, drawing his attention to the fact that anything he declares 
may be used against him. 
According to Art. 374 of the New Criminal Procedure Code and 
Art. 322 of the former Criminal Procedure Code, the president of the 
panel of judges, after reading the writ of summons, shall explain to 
the defendant what charges are brought against him and shall inform 
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the defendant about the right not to make any statement, drawing his 
attention to the fact that what he declars may also be used against 
him.
Article 375 par. (5) of the New Criminal Procedure Code and Art. 
325 par. (2) of the former Criminal Procedure Code provide that, in 
the course of the judicial investigation, if the defendant refuses to 
make statements, the court shall order the reading of the statements 
he has previously made.
For the first time, the New Code of Criminal Procedure also 
regulates in Art. 118 the witness’s right not to incriminate himself, 
according to which “a witness statement given by a person who, in 
the same case, had the capacity of suspect or defendant prior to such 
testimony or acquired it subsequently, may not be used against him”.
Therefore, the Romanian legislator makes reference to the 
privilege against self-incrimination in relation to two of the forms 
in which the right to silence is manifested: the right of the suspect or 
the defendant not to make any statements and the right of the witness 
not to incriminate himself.
Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention implicitly 
guarantees two distinct rights: the right to silence and the right not to 
contribute to one’s own incrimination.
It has been stated in the doctrine2 that “the two guarantees must 
be regarded as representing two notions that only partially overlap 
each other. The right to silence is narrower, in that it only refers 
to verbal communication, the right not to speak. The right to non-
self-incrimination is clearly more comprehensive, because it is not 
limited to verbal expression, protecting individuals also against the 
obligation to deliver documents”.
On the other hand, with regard to other issues, the scope of the 
right to silence is wider than the right to avoid self-incrimination, as 
it does not protect individuals only against the obligation to make 
statements to their own detriment, but also against the obligation to 
make any kind of statements. Practice has shown that sometimes even 
seemingly unimportant or insignificant questions are particularly 
risky for an accused. If he is not careful, there is a greater risk of 
making involuntary confessions or contradictory statements. These 
can be used to weaken the suspect’s position and may affect the 
credibility of his statements on key issues. It is therefore important 
for the right to silence to be guaranteed in its “pure and absolute 
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form, not according to a rigid and literal interpretation of the texts”.
It has been shown in the case law3 that the obligation imposed by 
the legislator on the person who has committed a car accident not to 
leave the scene of the accident is not equivalent to a violation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. In the case in question, it was 
considered that the stay at the accident scene of the defendant who 
was accused of robbery (stealing a car by using violence), driving 
without a licence and leaving the accident scene (all deeds being 
committed on the same evening) was not equivalent to a self-denun-
ciation or self-incrimination with regard to the first two offences.
The right to silence does not include a person’s right not to give 
information about his own identity (the right to anonymity4). In this 
respect, Art. 107 par. (1) of the New Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 
70 par. (1) of the former Criminal Procedure Code) provides that 
the suspect or defendant, before being heard, is asked about their 
surname and first name, nickname, birth date and place, surname 
and first name of their parents, their citizenship, education, military 
status, working place, occupation, address where they actually live, 
their criminal record, as well as any other data intended to establish 
their personal status.
Procedural guarantees
The guarantee of the right not to make any statement is accom-
panied by the warning procedure5, which implies the obligation 
of the authorities to draw the attention of the suspect or defendant 
to the fact that what he declares may also be used against him. This 
procedure is derived from the case law of the US law courts, known 
as “the Miranda warning” or “the Miranda rules”6.
If the suspect or defendant decides to make statements in the case 
or to cooperate with the judicial bodies in order to determine the 
truth, his attitude may be considered as a mitigating judicial circum-
stance7.
If, in the course of the trial, the defendant refuses to make 
statements, invoking the right to silence, the court shall order the 
reading of the statements he has previously made. The reading of 
the statements by the judge is not a violation of the defendant’s right 
to silence, provided that such statements have been obtained in the 
absence of any “inappropriate constraints”. Through this procedural 
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attitude, the defendant cannot rule out the possibility for the judge of 
the case to assess previously administered statements in accordance 
with the principles of procedural fairness. However, the court will 
not have the possibility to draw conclusions about the guilt of the 
defendant from his remaining silent.
At E.U. level, interest has been expressed towards the 
harmonization of the means of guaranteeing the rights of persons 
suspected to have committed an offence at the time of their being 
deprived of their liberty, in view of reducing judicial errors and 
breaches of the provisions of the European Convention. Thus, Art. 14 
of the Proposal for an E.U. Council Framework Decision on certain 
procedural rights granted in the criminal proceedings throughout the 
E.U.8 provides for the need to hand over to the person suspected of 
committing an offence, as soon as possible before the first hearing, 
a printed standardized document drawn up in a language he knows 
(statement of rights) in which the fundamental rights he enjoys 
should be mentioned in a simple and accessible form.
In light of these considerations, we believe that simply bringing 
to the knowledge of the suspects and defendants their right not to 
make statements is an insignificant application of the right to silence, 
which restricts excessively the scope of the conventional protection.
We consider that, in order for the requirements imposed by the 
European Court to be fulfilled, the criminal prosecution bodies and 
the courts have the obligation to notify the suspects, defendants and 
witnesses of their right to silence, as well as of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, in addition to the rights provided for by Art. 83 
letter (a) of the New Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 70 par. (2) of the 
former Criminal Procedure Code), respectively by Art. 225 par. 8 of 
the New Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 143 par. (3) of the former 
Criminal Procedure Code).
On the other hand, as is clear from the case-law of the European 
Court of Justice and from Art. 118 of the New Criminal Procedure 
Code, the witness, too, enjoys the right to silence and the right not 
to contribute to his own incrimination, insofar as the statement he 
makes might be self-incriminating. For example, in cases where, 
as a result of successive severances, a suspect or defendant in the 
initial file (the parent file) becomes a witness in a case file severed 
therefrom, and, in this capacity, he enjoys the right to silence and the 
right to avoid self-incrimination with regard to issues which, once 
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they have been reported, might incriminate him in the case file in 
which he is accused. In this respect, we consider that the judicial 
bodies who find that the witness might incriminate himself through 
the statement he makes have the obligation to suspend the hearing 
and to communicate to the witness the fact that he has the right to 
remain silent and that, on the basis of the statements by which he 
incriminates himself, criminal prosecution could be initiated against 
him.
The sanction for not informing the witness, suspect or defendant 
of their right to silence and of the privilege against self-incrimination 
is the exclusion of the illegally or unfairly obtained evidence, 
according to Art. 102 par. (2) of the New Criminal Procedure Code 
(64 par. (2) of the former Criminal Procedure Code), both in the case 
of the hearing during the criminal prosecution and in the case of the 
hearing in the judicial investigation phase9.
The exclusion of evidence is a specific procedural sanction, 
applicable in the matter of evidence produced in violation of the 
principle of legality, loyalty, as well as in cases where the fundamental 
rights and liberties guaranteed by the European Convention10 have 
been significantly and substantially violated, to such an extent as 
to affect the fairness of the procedure. There is a special scope of 
implementation for this sanction, which is thus distinct from the 
sanction of nullity applicable to trial or procedural steps.
As a result, in the Cesnieks v. Latvia11 case, it was established that 
the use in the criminal proceedings of evidence obtained by violating 
one of the fundamental rights provided for by the Convention always 
raises issues related to the fairness of the criminal proceedings, even 
if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in the rendering 
of the decision to convict a person. Therefore, the use in the trial of 
statements obtained in violation of Art. 3 and Art. 6 of the Convention 
entails the invalidity of the entire judicial procedure (El Haski v. 
Belgium case).
In the case of a hearing held for the adoption of a preventive 
measure, without the right to silence and to avoid self-incrimination 
being brought to the knowledge of the suspect or defendant, we 
consider that we are not dealing with a situation of absolute or relative 
nullity12, but still with that of the exclusion of unlawfully produced 
evidence, given that these are guarantees against the unlawful or 
unfair production of evidence. The hearing required upon adopting 
Administratīvā un Kriminālā Justīcija Nr. 2/2018
32
preventive measures must always be carried out in the presence of 
a chosen or public (ex officio) defender, the latter being necessary 
in order to provide effective defence for the suspect or defendant. In 
this way, we consider that the situation of a procedural harm which 
could entail nullity is avoided.
As far as we are concerned, we think that the data and information 
resulting from such a statement cannot be used in charging the 
suspect or defendant, the court having to exclude his statement from 
the means of evidence it uses in order to retain the existence of a 
reasonable suspicion regarding the committing of a criminal offence.
Similarly, the sanction of the exclusion of evidence must also apply 
to equally produced evidence, based on information obtained from 
unlawfully produced evidence (derived evidence), the application of 
the doctrine of the “remote effect” or “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
(fruit of the poisonous tree) becoming thus necessary.
We believe that if, through the violation of the right to silence 
and to avoid self-incrimination, evidence has been unlawfully or 
unfairly produced, and from such evidence have resulted facts and 
circumstances which have directly and necessarily led the bodies 
of criminal prosecution to lawfully producing other evidence (the 
production of the illegal means of evidence being a sine qua non 
condition for the production of the lawful means of evidence), the 
latter are to be excluded, and that the courts cannot ground their 
decision on such derived evidence.
Purpose of the privilege of silence within the meaning of the 
ECHR
The source of the legal provisions provided by Art. 83 letter a) of 
the New Criminal Procedure Code is to be found in the international 
acts relevant for the criminal proceedings: The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights13, which provides in Art. 14 
point (3) that “any person accused of committing a criminal offence 
shall be entitled not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt”. Article 55 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court establishes that, in an investigation initiated on the basis of the 
Statute, a person is not under the obligation to testify against himself 
or to confess his own guilt.
There is a rich jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
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Rights (ECHR) as determined by art. 6 (2) of the Convention. In 
Funke v. France, the Court found a violation of the right of the 
person to be silenced by a request for the provision of precisely 
identified documents, namely: the extract from his bank accounts 
abroad, under threat of penal sanctions in case of refusal.
In the case Allan v. The United Kingdom, the ECHR set out a 
number of requirements and considerations regarding the right 
to silence in the context of a fair trial. If the accused has been 
intercepted in violation of his right to silence, his actual possibility 
of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing the 
use thereof according to the principle of contradiction should be 
achieved, to the extent that the applicant’s admissions [occurred] 
in the course of his own conversation conducted voluntarily, as an 
expression of reality, without there being any trap or another activity 
meant to give rise to such confessions, [while also considering] the 
quality of the evidence, including the determination of whether the 
circumstances in which the confession was obtained raises doubts 
regarding its realibility or accuracy. In the same case, the Court 
recalls that the petitioner’s words being recorded at the police station 
and the penitentiary, performed when he was in the company of his 
accomplice (in other offences), of his [girl]friend and of the police 
informant, as well as the testimony of the informant constitute the 
main evidence of the prosecution against him. The ECHR remarks, 
firstly, that the materials obtained through audio and video recordings 
are not illegal, and are not contrary to domestic law. There is no 
indication of the fact that the admissions made by the applicant while 
talking to his accomplice or his [girl]friend were not voluntary, in the 
sense of him being coerced or deceived into making those statements, 
since he might have been aware of the possibility of being recorded 
at the police station. The Court established that it was not convinced 
that the use of the materials regarding the accomplice and the friend 
was contrary to the requirements regarding a fair trial provided by 
Art. 6 of the European Convention.
The purpose of the privileges against self-incrimination is, in 
the Court’s view, to protect the accused from inappropriate actions 
of the authorities and, thus, to avoid judicial errors. The right to 
non-self-incrimination is primarily aimed at respecting the accused 
person’s will to remain silent and assumes that, in criminal cases, 
the prosecution has the burden of proof against the accused, without 
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obtaining the evidence by coercive or oppressive methods, against 
the accused person’s will14.
The Court recalls that, even if Art. 6 of the Convention does not 
expressly mention the right to remain silent and one of its components 
– the right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination, it is, however, 
proved by its presence in the recognized international norms which 
lie at the centre of the notion of a fair trial, as enshrined by this 
Article15. The Court also points out that, in this case, the reasons 
for which this right exists in international rules, are in particular 
related to the need to protect the accused against the application 
of abusive coercive force by the authorities, which leads to the 
avoidance of judicial errors and allows for the goals stipulated by 
Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to be achieved. 
In particular, the right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination 
presupposes that, in a criminal case, the prosecution seeks to ground 
its argumentation without recourse to evidence, obtained through 
coercion or pressure, against the will of the accused. It has rightly 
been shown in the doctrine that the prosecution bodies are obliged, as 
soon as the commission of the flagrant offence has been established, 
to inform the perpetrator about his rights to defend himself, including 
the right to silence16. This right is closely related to the principle 
of the presumption of innocence enshrined in Art. 6 par. (2) of the 
Convention. At the same time, the right not to incriminate himself 
primarily refers to respecting the decision of an accused to remain 
silent.
What is understood as common to the legal systems does not 
extend to the use, in the criminal proceedings, of data which could 
be obtained from the accused by recourse to coercive forces, but 
which exist independently of the suspect’s will, such as documents 
obtained on the basis of a warrant, determining the state of 
inebriation, collecting blood and urine, as well as body tissues in 
view of performing DNA tests.
It should be noted, however, that it is possible to formulate 
reasonings that are unfavourable to the silence of an accused during 
the proceedings. In the case John Murray v. the United Kingdom17, 
the European Court states that “the right to remain silent is not an 
absolute right”. Even though it is incompatible with such immunity 
to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or 
on his refusal to answer questions, it is obvious that this privilege 
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does not prevent an accused’s silence being taken into account in 
situations which clearly call for an explanation from him.
In the case Condron v. the United Kingdom18, the Court ruled 
that jurors should receive from the judge appropriate instructions 
regarding conclusions to the detriment of an accused, which may 
result from his silence. Otherwise, drawing conclusions from the 
silence of the person concerned constitutes a violation of Art. 6 of 
the Convention.
The Court has also ruled on several instances of use of police 
informants19 in a number of cases, and the Court has retained that the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination primarily 
have the role of protecting against inappropriate actions by the 
authorities and against obtaining evidence by coercive or oppressive 
methods, which are contrary to the will of the accused. The scope 
of the right is not limited to cases in which the accused has suffered 
or has been made to suffer directly in any way. This right, which 
the Court has retained as a part of the notion of fair trial, serves, 
in principle, to the protection of the freedom of a person called to 
choose whether to answer or not the questions of the police. This 
freedom of choice is undermined in cases where the suspect having 
chosen to remain silent during interrogations, the authorities resort 
to the subterfuge of obtaining testimonies from the suspect or other 
incriminating statements which they were not able to obtain during 
the interrogations, and these testimonies or statements are presented 
as evidence in the trial. The assessment, in this case, of the extent to 
which the undermining of the right to silence constitutes a violation 
of Art. 6 of the Convention, depends on the circumstances of the 
individual case. The Court notes that, in the interrogations, the 
applicant, following the advice of his lawyer, has constantly chosen 
to remain silent. An arrested person, who had been a long-time 
police informant, was placed in the cell of the applicant, in order to 
obtain information from him about his involvement in committing 
the crime he was suspected of.
The evidence presented in the trial indicates that the informant 
was instructed by the police to make him confess, so that the decisive 
evidence in the prosecution obtained in this way was not produced 
spontaneously, voluntarily, but was determined by the persistent 
questions of the informant who, under the guidance of the police, 
channeled the discussion towards the circumstances of the offence.
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This can be regarded as a functional equivalent of an interrogation, 
but in the absence of any form of protection which exists in the case 
of a formal police interrogation, including the presence of a lawyer 
and the usual warnings. The Court considers that the applicant 
was subjected to psychological pressures that also influenced the 
“voluntary” character of the applicant’s statements made to the 
informant: he was being held in detention, suspected of murder; 
being under the direct pressure of police interrogations with regard 
to the murder, he proved to be susceptible to persuasion by the 
informant, with whom he shared the same cell for several weeks, 
into confiding in him. Under the circumstances, the information 
obtained by using the informant in such a way can be regarded as 
contrary to the accused person’s right to silence and privilege against 
self-incrimination. Therefore, Art. 6 point (1) of the Convention was 
violated in this respect.
In a number of cases related to the conduct of police interrogations, 
the judges in Strasbourg identified some violations of Art. 6; when 
incriminating statements, obtained from a suspect who had been 
deprived of any contact with the outside under oppressive detention 
conditions and without access to a lawyer, had been used in the trial20. 
The Court adopted an identical position with regard to statements or 
evidence obtained by using questionable methods without taking into 
account their use before the court (the case Heaney and Mc Guinness 
v. Ireland), in which case the applicants obtained contradictory 
information about their rights during police interrogations, which 
compelled them to give up their right to remain silent21.
The examination of petitions with regard to the use of undercover 
agents in the proceedings holds a special place. In the case of Liidi 
v. Switzerland, the Court did not find any violation of the right to a 
fair trial because the undercover agent concerned was under oath, 
the investigating judge was aware of his mission and the authorities 
opened a preliminary investigation against the petitioner. The Court 
concluded to the contrary in the case Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 
where the police acted outside any judicial control, the applicant 
having no criminal record, which is not an obstacle to the conduct of 
a criminal investigation.
It should be noted that there is a link between statements of 
admission of guilt obtained through coercion and unfavourable 
conclusions elicited by illegal methods from a suspect, thus violating 
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his right to remain silent22. The Court established there was a violation 
of Art. 6 par. 2 if the court acknowledged the applicants’ guilt on 
the ground that they had refused to answer the questions of the 
police (case Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, and case Quinn 
v. Ireland). Even though the applicant was not criminally punished 
for his refusal to answer the questions, there was a violation of Art. 6 
par. (2) of the Convention starting from the moment when the police 
communicated to him contradictory or obscure information about 
his right to remain silent, especially if his lawyer did not attend the 
interrogations (case Averill v. the United Kingdom).
In another case, Condron v. the United Kingdom, the Court 
found that the communication of inappropriate instructions to jurors 
as to the nature of the conclusions that may be drawn from the 
silence of a suspect during his interrogation by the police constitutes 
an infringement of Art. 6, insofar as that procedural flaw has not 
been repaired in the appeal; the applicant had been detained and 
interrogated while suffering the effects of heroin deprivation23.
The witness’s right not to incriminate himself
An element of novelty in our domestic legislation but which is 
extremely often resorted to in international legislation is the use by 
the witness of the right to silence and that of not contributing to his 
own incrimination.
The New Criminal Procedure Code, in Art. 114 par. (1), defines 
the notion of witness as being “any person who has knowledge of 
the facts or factual circumstances constituting evidence in a criminal 
case”.
The notion requires the following clarifications provided for in 
par. (2) of the same Article: “any person summoned as a witness has 
the obligation to appear before the judicial body that summoned him 
at the location, on the day and at the time indicated in the summons, 
to take an oath or a make a solemn declaration before the court and 
to tell the truth”.
According to Art. 6 par. 3 letter d) of the European Convention, 
“everyone charged with a criminal offence has, in particular, the 
right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him”, thus being 
ensured compliance with the principle of contradiction in the 
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criminal proceedings. In several judgments, the European Court has 
emphasized that the notion of witness has an autonomous meaning 
in the context of the Convention24. Insofar as a statement, whether 
made by a witness within the strict meaning of the word, or made 
by a co-defendant, is likely to substantiate the conviction of the 
accused, it is a testimony for the prosecution25. The Court also 
included the civil party in the notion of witness, taking as a starting 
point the defendant’s right in a fair trial to challenge the civil party’s 
statements26.
Within the meaning of Art. 6 par. 3 letter d) of the Convention, an 
expert was also recognized as having the capacity of witness when, 
in a public action, he approaches the legal position of a witness in the 
prosecution. There are different notions used in the Court’s case-law 
which have the meaning of witness in cases where the principle of 
proportionality imposes the need either for protecting witnesses, or 
for maintaining their anonymity.
In order to determine the notion of witness, it should be noted that, 
starting from the need to protect vulnerable witnesses and victims, 
the European Court has shown the following: although Art. 6 does 
not expressly impose the protection of victims and witnesses, their 
interests, especially their life, freedom, safety, must be taken into ac-
count and, therefore, the States are obliged to protect those interests. 
In some cases, the nature of the offences is also important for the 
protection of vulnerable witnesses27. In a large number of cases, the 
phrase anonymous witnesses is used, when it comes to using them 
for the production of evidence for the indictment, the fact being also 
mentioned in the legal doctrine. It has been shown that anonymous 
witnesses are people who have been heard by protecting their iden-
tity or by including them in special protection programmes and who 
have made statements about the facts of which the respective per-
son is accused28. In its case-law29, the Court has shown that the use 
of anonymous witnesses is not incompatible with the provisions of 
the Convention. The court also includes in the notion of anonymous 
witnesses infiltrated agents from the police bodies, who, unlike other 
disinterested anonymous witnesses or the victims of the crimes, have 
a general duty to be subordinated to the authorities. They can be used 
with the preservation of anonymity for their own protection and that 
of their families, as well as in order to avoid compromising their use 
in future operations.
In the Court’s case law there is also mention of the notion of 
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provocative agents who are agents infiltrated by the State or any 
person acting under the coordination or supervision of an authority30 
whose intervention should also be supported by guarantors31.
We conclude that the witness’s right to refuse to file statements 
should not be affected by the need to establish the truth. The witness 
must have the right to assess whether, in a given situation, making a 
testimony can put his or her safety at risk. From another standpoint, 
the witness’s right to refuse to testify should not be absolute. We 
consider that the witness who is called to court should give reasons 
for his refusal, and the court, considering the circumstances of the 
case, should decide either to accept the witness’s refusal to testify or 
to apply the necessary measures of protection.
Thus, with the entry into force of the new Criminal Procedure 
Code, in our country, too, the witness now enjoys the right to remain 
silent and not to contribute to his own incrimination, insofar as, by 
making a statement, he might incriminate himself. Cases where, as a 
result of successive severances, a suspect or defendant in the initial 
file becomes a witness in a case file severed from the former file, 
he can enjoy, in this capacity, the right to silence and to avoid self-
incrimination with regard to matters which, once reported, could 
incriminate him in the case file in which he is an accused.
This right was expressly enshrined in Art. 118 of the New Criminal 
Procedure Code, according to which the witness statement made 
by a person who, in the same case, had the capacity of suspect or 
defendant prior to such testimony or acquired it subsequently, may 
not be used against him. The judicial bodies have the obligation to 
mention, at the time of recording the statement, the previous legal 
standing of the witness. In this case, too, the witness is not under the 
obligation to make statements, and if he refuses to do so, he cannot 
be held responsible for committing the offence of false testimony.
It is also worth mentioning that the witness’s refusal to testify can 
be conditioned not only by the assumed danger, but also by the risk 
of compromising himself. In this respect, it is particularly difficult or 
quite impossible to determine in the law all the situations in which 
the witness would have the right to refuse testimonies by invoking 
the argument of the risk of compromising himself.
According to Art. 115 of the New Criminal Procedure Code, “any 
person may be summoned and heard as a witness, except for the 
parties and the main trial subjects”. Therefore, the person who is 
itself the object of the investigation should be excluded from the 
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category of persons susceptible of being witnesses. However, in 
practice, there are frequent cases where a person provides relevant 
information regarding the role of the accomplices in the given case. 
In addition to the fact that those persons require protection, the issue 
of their responsibility for false indictin statements is raised.
Thus, the legislator did not admit the possibility of drawing in 
the defendant as a witness. From this standpoint, two issues can be 
brought into discussion: the first concerns the use of a perpetrator 
as a witness without certain direct legal consequences regarding the 
penalty to be applied or other matters relating to his future fate; the 
second refers to either the decision not to prosecute the person or 
to reduce their penalty. In the former case, we are faced with the 
classical situation of a person who makes statements about his 
accomplices hoping that the court will consider that such a statement 
should have consequences on the penalty to be applied, recognizing 
this fact as a mitigating circumstance. The latter case refers to certain 
procedural institutions that would be used depending on the degree 
of co-operation of the accused. Currently, the institution of the 
guilty plea (Articles 478-488 of the New Criminal Procedure Code) 
introduced by the new Criminal Procedure Code is being used.
A person who is a defendant in another criminal case can also 
participate as a witness in the criminal trial. In addition to the 
right to silence of the accused, the person is also protected by the 
immunity from being sanctioned for his refusal to cooperate with 
the authorities.
Finally, the person executing a custodial sentence may also 
participate as a witness. This is a person who has been punished by 
imprisonment either in the same case or in another case.
Conclusions
The right to silence enjoys increased attention from the Romanian 
legislator and is currently regulated by the Criminal Procedure 
Code (Law no. 135/2010), which entered into force on 1st February 
2014; the elements of absolute novelty are rectifying the internal 
regulations that have become incompatible with the current reality 
and with the European and international regulations in the matter, 
aligning the Romanian legislation with the latter ones, including in 
the matter of the right to silence and of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
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Anotācija
Raksts veltīts tiesību klusēt un tiesību neliecināt pret sevi analīzei 
Rumānijas kriminālprocesa tiesībās. 
Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesa ir atzinusi, ka tiesības klusēt policijas 
pratināšanā un privilēģija neliecināt pret sevi ir vispāratzīts 
starptautisks standarts, kas ir taisnīga tiesas procesa pamatā. 
Neraugoties uz to, ka šīs tiesības Eiropas Cilvēktiesību un 
pamatbrīvību aizsardzības konvencijā nav īpaši minētas, tomēr tās 
izriet no šīs konvencijas 6. panta 1. punkta. Saskaņā ar šīm tiesībām, 
personu, pret kuru vērsts process, nevar piespiest liecināt un apstākli, 
ka persona nesniedz liecības, nevar uzskatīt par tādu, kas apstiprina 
personas vainu.
Tiesības neliecināt pret sevi izriet arī no Eiropas Cilvēktiesību 
tiesas secinājumiem, kas pamatoti ar Eiropas Cilvēktiesību un 
pamatbrīvību aizsardzības konvencijas 6. panta 1. punktu. Šīs tiesības 
nozīmē to, ka neviena amatpersona vai iestāde nevar piespiest 
personu sniegt liecības, kas apstiprina šīs personas iespējami izdarītu 
noziedzīgu nodarījumu. Šīs personas var atteikties liecināt, atbildēt 
uz atsevišķiem jautājumiem, vai iesniegt dokumentus vai citus 
objektus, kas viņus varētu apsūdzēt.
